Authenticated Key-Value Stores with Hardware Enclaves by Tang, Yuzhe et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
12
06
8v
3 
 [c
s.C
R]
  6
 N
ov
 20
19
Authenticated Key-Value Stores with Hardware Enclaves
Yuzhe (Richard) Tang
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY USA
ytang100@syr.edu
Ju Chen
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY USA
jchen133@syr.edu
Kai Li
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY USA
kli111@syr.edu
Jianliang Xu
Hong Kong Baptist University
Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
xujl@comp.hkbu.edu.hk
Qi Zhang
IBM Research, TJ Watson
Yorktown Heights, NY USA
Q.Zhang@ibm.com
ABSTRACT
Authenticated data storage on an untrusted platform is an important
computing paradigm for cloud applications ranging from data
outsourcing, to cryptocurrency and general transparency logs. These
modern applications increasingly feature update-intensive workloads,
whereas existing authenticated data structures (ADSs) designed with
in-place updates are inefficient to handle such workloads. In this
paper, we address this issue and propose a novel authenticated
log-structured merge tree (eLSM) based key-value store by leveraging
Intel SGX enclaves.
We present a system design that runs the code of eLSM store inside
enclave. To circumvent the limited enclave memory (128 MB with
the latest Intel CPUs), we propose to place the memory buffer of the
eLSM store outside the enclave and protect the buffer using a new
authenticated data structure by digesting individual LSM-tree levels.
We design protocols to support query authentication in data integrity,
completeness (under range queries), and freshness. The proof in
our protocol is made small by including only the Merkle proofs at
selective levels.
We implement eLSM on top of Google LevelDB and Facebook
RocksDB with minimal code change and performance interference.
We evaluate the performance of eLSM under the YCSB workload
benchmark and show a performance advantage of up to 4.5X
speedup.
1. INTRODUCTION
The practice of outsourcing data storage to the public cloud has
been emerging and gaining popularity in security applications. For
instance, using Amazon S3 to store the Bitcoin transactions (in
cryptocurrency applications) or to host general transparency logs
(e.g., in Google Certificate Transparency [1, 2]) can significantly
bring down the operational cost of these security-centric schemes
and are adopted in practice [3]. The modern security applications
features user-generated content continuously generated in an
intensive data-write stream (e.g., cryptocurrency transactions and
user-requested certificates; see § 3.1 for details).
Data authenticity is the primary concern for storing and serving
data on the untrusted cloud services which are constantly caught
compromised in the real world. To guarantee data authenticity, a
common approach is to employ the protocols of authenticated data
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structures (ADSs) between an untrusted cloud server and trusted
clients (i.e., data owner and query users). However, existing ADS
schemes [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] have several major
limitations. First, they are designed based on update-in-place
structures (i.e., requiring excessive communication and large proofs
between the data owner and the cloud for updating the ADS), leading
to known inefficiency problems in handling data updates [14, 15].
Second, existing schemes require the query users to verify the proof
of results obtained from the cloud, which incurs high bandwidth and
computation overheads at the query clients.
To address these limitations, in this paper, we leverage off-the-shelf
hardware enclaves, in particular Intel Software Guard eXtension
(SGX) [16], and propose a novel authenticated key-value store
based on LSM trees. The motivation of our design is two-fold:
1. (Why LSM tree?) An LSM tree (log-structured merge
tree) is a data structure that supports append-only writes and
random-access data reads. Periodically, it conducts a batch
operation, called COMPACTION, that reorganizes the data layout
for better read performance in the future. By this design, an
LSM tree has performance advantages in serving high-speed write
streams and is widely adopted as the external-memory index
structure in many modern storage systems including Google’s
BigTable [17]/LevelDB [18], Facebook RocksDB [19], Apache
HBase [20], Apache Cassandra [21] (see § 2 for details). 2. (Why
Intel SGX?) Without a trusted party, realizing an authenticated LSM
tree on the cloud requires using costly cryptographic protocols, such
as verifiable computations (VC [22, 23, 24, 25, 26]), to support
verifiable COMPACTION.1 With the advent of commercial trusted
execution environments, notably Intel Software Guard eXtension or
SGX [16], it is possible to build a trusted execution environment
or enclave in proximity to the untrusted cloud platform. This
makes bulk data transfer feasible and should be promising to support
verifiable and efficient COMPACTION for authenticated LSM trees. In
addition, the query users can be alleviated from the burden of result
verification.
In our envisioned architecture, trusted cloud applications (e.g., a
database server) run inside SGX enclaves and issue data read/write
requests to our authenticated key-value store that is co-located in
the cloud. In our system design, the code (namely the codebase of
a vanilla LSM store2) is placed inside the enclave, which relies on
the Intel SGX SDK [27] or an in-enclave Library OS (LibOS) [28,
29] to handle system calls. In terms of placing data (e.g., program
states), a naive design is to store the data in the memory region
inside the enclave. When handling data of Gigabytes, this design,
however, imposes huge memory pressure inside enclave and would
cause significant performance slowdown. To be more specific, the
1Another possible approach is to transfer the whole dataset back to
trusted data owners over the Internet, which is also expensive.
2“LSM store” denotes the class of key-value stores designed based
on LSM trees.
current family of Intel CPUs support 128 MB physical memory in
the enclave, and when the enclave memory hosts more than 128
MB, it causes expensive enclave paging [30]. In our preliminary
performance study, the overhead causes slowdown of more than two
orders of magnitudes (See § 4.2 for details). More fundamentally, the
slowdown is caused by the security needs to protect enclave memory.
Even if Intel may remove the hard memory limits of 128 MB in future
releases, putting the large data in a (larger) enclave still incurs the
large slowdown by memory protection.
To circumvent the inefficiency, we propose to place the memory
data outside the enclave. More precisely, among various memory
data structures in an LSM store, we place the read buffer outside the
enclave and leave other structures that often grow sublinearly with the
data size inside the enclave, including index structures (e.g., a bloom
filter), write buffer, etc. To ensure the integrity of the data placed
outside the enclave, we propose an authenticated LSM tree, named by
eLSM. eLSM builds a forest of Merkle trees, each digesting a “level”
in an LSM tree (see the preliminary of an LSM tree in § 2). eLSM
supports efficient reads and small-sized query proofs by presenting
Merkle proofs at selective levels. We have proved the security of the
query authentication schemes in eLSM (in § 5.3.1).
We also build the eLSM systems on Google LevelDB [18] and
Facebook RocksDB [19]. In our systems, the eLSM Merkle
proofs are embedded in individual data records in such a way
that the proof of a query can be naturally constructed from the
Merkle proofs embedded in the data records included in the query
result. By this means, we minimize the code change needed in
Google LevelDB, reducing performance interference at runtime. For
RocksDB, the eLSM system is implemented as a middleware that
does not require code change of the underlying RocksDB, but instead
just relies on its callback interface [31]. More specifically, we
implement authenticated COMPACTION in some event handlers in the
COMPACTION path of RocksDB. With this, we believe the add-on
design of eLSM is generally applicable to any LSM stores. By
contrast, existing work in the field, notably Speicher [32], all requires
significant code change of underlying LSM store (see § 7 for details).
We conduct a comprehensive performance study of eLSM under
the YCSB workload benchmark [33]. The performance result shows
that eLSM achieves lower operation latency than the baseline of
update-in-place data structures by more than one order of magnitudes.
Comparing with the eLSM design with memory buffers in the
enclave, the memory placement outside the enclave achieves up to
4.5X speedup in most YCSB workloads.
The contributions made in this paper include the following:
1. This work addresses an emerging security workload, that is,
supporting query authentication in the presence of frequent data
updates. We propose a novel SGX-enabled authenticated key-value
store.
2. We present the system designs of eLSM that are secure,
efficient and generic. It places the memory data outside the enclave
to circumvent the limited memory size in the enclave. It builds
an authenticated LSM tree with small query proofs at selective
tree levels. To the best of our knowledge, eLSM is the first
data-authentication middleware on LSM stores, without any code
change of the underlying store.
3. We implemented functional prototypes of eLSM on Google
LevelDB and Facebook RocksDB. The code of our prototype is
open-sourced [34]. We conducted a comprehensive performance
study under the YCSB workload benchmark that shows up to 4.5X
performance advantage.
2. PRELIMINARY: LSM TREE-BASED
STORAGE SYSTEMS
This section presents the preliminaries of LSM trees and stores.
Readers who are familiar with the details of LSM stores may skip this
section. Additional background on Intel SGX is deferred to Appendix
§ A.
Data structure: A log-structured merge tree or LSM tree [35] is a
data structure that organizes a dataset by so-called levels. A level is a
collection of key-value records that are written in a time of proximity.
Inside a level, it stores a sorted run of records, first ordered by data
keys and then by time. Upon a write, an LSM tree stores it in the
first level. The first level is thus a mutable data structure updated by
individual data writes. Upon a read, it searches the tree by iterating
through levels and finds the record that matches the queried data
key. Periodically, normally at an offline time, the LSM tree runs a
COMPACTION operation that merges sorted runs in adjacent levels,
to make room in lower levels3 for upcoming writes and to facilitate
reads in the future. An LSM tree consists of totally q levels, which
are L0, L1, ....
Storage systems: LSM trees have been recently adopted
in the design of many modern storage systems, including
Google BigTable [17]/LevelDB [18], Apache HBase [20], Apache
Cassandra [21], Facebook RocksDB [19], etc. In these systems,
the LSM tree is adopted as an external-memory data structure that
manages disk IOs. Specifically, the LSM tree buffers the first-level
data in memory (stored in the MemTable structure) and, through the
COMPACTION operation, stores data at higher levels on disk. The
data stored in MemTable is backed up by a log file on disk, named
Write-Ahead Log or WAL. Data records are written to disk in a large
data unit (e.g., several megabytes). Each data unit is persisted in a
so-called SSTable file (Sorted Strings Table [17, 18, 19]). By this
means, random-access writes are buffered in memory and the system
causes only sequential writes to disk.
The LSM tree is also used as a primary index in the key-value store
system. An SSTable is a file consisting of multiple data blocks. To
support fast data reads in an SSTable, there is a compact B+ tree that
indexes the different data blocks in the SSTable. In addition, a Bloom
filter is built for each data block that indexes the records in the block.
A Bloom filter can facilitate the case when the queried key is not
found in the block.
In terms of performance, the LSM-tree based storage design
represents a middle ground between the two classic designs, that is,
the read-optimized update-in-place storage (e.g., B+ tree and many
database indices [36, 37]) and the write-optimized log-structured
storage (e.g., log-structured file systems [38]). On the one hand, an
LSM tree (in an external memory model) serves data writes in an
append-only fashion, in a way similar to log-structured file systems.
On the other hand, it supports random-access reads without scanning
the entire dataset, which is similar to update-in-place style B+ trees.
An LSM tree reaps the benefits from both worlds, at the expense of
assuming some offline hours to do the batched compaction operation.
3. RESEARCH FORMULATION
In this section, we present the research formulation by describing
the motivating application and workloads, system model, security
goals and design rationale of eLSM.
3.1 Motivating Scenarios
We present in depth a motivating scenario of our work, that
is, general transparency. Other motivating applications, such as
outsourced cloud databases, are explained in Appendix § B.
Application scenario: General transparency becomes a popular
design paradigm for building trusted computing systems [39, 40],
where internal events of a target system are recorded in and exposed
to a publicly-auditable log. The transparency design is being
adopted in many operational systems in the real world, including
certificate transparency (or CT) [1, 41, 42], key transparency [2],
and public Blockchains [43, 44]. In particular, CT exposes the
certificates issued by known Certificate Authorities (CA) to the public
3Levels in an LSM tree are indexed and the levels with smaller
indexes are lower levels.
in order for timely detection of mis-issued certificates [45, 46]. The
Blockchain records buyer-seller transactions in a public ledger and
allows anyone to audit the transaction history for assurance of no
invalid transactions.
The application workload features 1) an intensive stream of
small-data writes and 2) data reads that retrieve a selective part of
the log for auditing and cause random-access to the storage medium.
For instance, in Blockchain, transactions (i.e., small data writes) are
continuously submitted by a large number of buyers/sellers and new
Blockchain nodes who join the network as a simplified payment
verification client (i.e., SPV client [47]) randomly accesses part of
the transaction history (i.e., random-access reads). In the case of
CT log, certificate registration requests (i.e., small data writes) are
continuously submitted by a large number of domain owners (in the
low-cost CA schemes such as Let’s Encrypt [48]). Also, the log is
randomly accessed by web browsers running TLS handshakes which
want to validate the certificates being used.
The write-intensive workload excludes conventional database
storage engines that are designed based on update-in-place data
structures (e.g., B+ trees). In update-in-place structures, a data update
needs to overwrite the previous version of the record at the exact
location where the record is stored. An update incurs lookups and
random-accesses of the record’s previous location, leading to disk
seeks and write amplification.
LSM stores lend themselves to serving the write-intensive
workload, thanks to the design of append-only writes. Due to
this reason, many LSM stores are adopted in practice. For
cryptocurrency and Blockchain, Google’s LSM store LevelDB [18]
is widely adopted in the software stack of many Blockchain clients
including Bitcoin core [49], Ethereum [50], HyperLedger Fabric [51],
multichain/stream [52], and other crypto-currencies. LevelDB [18]
is used in Google CT systems [42] and RocksDB for the key
transparency systems [53, 54, 2].
However, in these real-world uses of LSM stores, the handling of
data integrity is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, data integrity is
a critical security property in our target applications.4 For instance,
in CT, returning a revoked certificate (violating data freshness) may
connect a user to an impersonator, leading to security breaches.
On the other hand, most existing transparency systems protect data
integrity by replicating data across many nodes. This design while
decentralizes trusts incurs high overhead. Using SGX enclave is
a much more lightweight approach. Thus, in this work, we are
motivated to harden the data integrity in LSM stores by SGX
enclaves.
3.2 System Model
In our system model, a trusted application runs inside the enclave
on an untrusted cloud platform. The trusted application manages
security-sensitive big-data and relies on a key-value store interface in
enclave for data storage. The trusted application emits a read/write
workload with characteristic described above (i.e., write-intensive
workloads). The interface between the trusted application and data
storage is a standard one in key-value store, described in Equation 1.
Given a key-value record 〈k, v〉, a write request is PUT(k, v) and a
read is v = GET(k). Here, we assume the enclave runs a timestamp
manager that assigns to a read/write operation a unique timestamp
reflecting the real time.
ts = PUT(k, v)
〈k, v, ts〉 = GET(k, tsq)
{〈k, v, ts〉} = SCAN(k1, k2, tsq) (1)
The trusted application can run in multiple threads and issues the
PUT/GET operations concurrently.
4By contrast, data confidentiality is less important in general
transparency systems.
3.3 Security Goals
The security goal of this work is primarily on query authenticity,
while we also address data confidentiality in § 5.6.2 and § 4.1. The
query authenticity describes that given a dataset, whether the result of
a read reflects the latest state of the dataset. To formally describe our
security goal, we present the threats and security definition below.
Threats: The adversary in our model is the untrusted host outside
the enclave. The adversarial host runs operating systems and the
instance of LSM store. She can mount attacks to present forged query
results to the enclave. Specifically, given a GET request, a malicious
host can forge a fake result (breaking query-result integrity), or
present a stale record (violating query freshness), or skip a legitimate
record (violating query completeness). The definitions of these
query-authenticity properties are described below.
Security definitions: Given a read 〈k, v, ts〉 = GET(k, tsq), the
query authenticity includes various correctness properties: 1) Query
integrity is about whether the read-result 〈k, v, ts〉 is a key-value
record written by a legitimate write request before. If the read result
is not written by the data owner, it violates the query integrity. 2)
Query completeness is about whether a read result is complete. In
case of point query (w.r.t. range query), the completeness is about the
membership of a result and it prevents a legitimate record from being
excluded in the result. For instance, if the store has a matching record
to the read but it returns an empty result, the query completeness5
is violated. 3) Query freshness states whether the result 〈k, v, ts〉
has the largest timestamp (or is the latest) among all records of the
queried key k and with a timestamp smaller/earlier than tsq .
3.4 Design Motivation: Why LSM Tree based
Digest Structure?
To support query authentication (with membership), the
conventional approach is building a single Merkle tree over the
entire dataset and updating the Merkle tree “in place” upon data
updates. This update-in-place Merkle tree design is widely adopted
in real-world systems such as digesting state in Ethereum [44].
To serve write-intensive workloads, however, the update-in-place
digesting approach would incur high performance overhead. Briefly,
with small data records (e.g., tens or hundreds of bytes as in a
“tweets”), the hash digests which themselves are tens of bytes can
grow comparable with the size of dataset itself. They need to be
stored on a large storage medium such as disk. With digests stored on
disk, the update-in-place digest structures cause random disk accesses
and thus impose high overhead to the write path.
In this work, we present a new digest structure based on an
LSM tree, called eLSM digests, where the digests are updated in
an append-only fashion. The motivation of this design is based on
the well-known fact [55, 56, 57, 58] that the append-only design
of an LSM tree leads to performance advantages when serving
write-intensive workloads. While existing LSM trees are applied
to the data-access path in a storage system, our proposed eLSM
presents a new paradigm that applies the LSM tree on the security
path, particularly for efficient digest accesses.
4. eLSM-P1: A STRAWMAN DESIGN
In this section, we present a straightforward design of LSM
store with SGX and name it by eLSM-P1. We then analyze the
performance to motivate our primary design eLSM-P2 presented in
the next section.
4.1 The eLSM-P1 Design
Design space: Recall that an LSM store is a user-space system
that translates application-level data reads/writes to systems-level file
reads/writes. To port an LSM store to SGX, in principle, one can
place the code of the LSM store outside the enclave. That is, the LSM
5We may use the terms query authenticity and membership
alternatively.
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Figure 1: eLSM on SGX: System stack and designs
store runs in the untrusted world and the trusted application in enclave
issues OCalls to send PUT/GET requests to the store. However,
this code-outside-enclave design requires excluding “dynamically”
updated memory data from enclave and incurs design complexity for
data authentication. We dismiss this alternative design (more details
in Appendix § D). In this work, we focus on building an LSM store
with code inside an SGX enclave.
A strawman: We consider a strawman design, named eLSM-P1,
that places the entire user-space codebase of an LSM store inside
the enclave. The SSTable files are stored outside the enclave. The
interaction between the enclave and the untrusted host occurs at the
syscall levels, primarily for file management (e.g., fwrite and
fread). Specifically, eLSM-P1 places outside the enclave the
files at all LSM-tree levels, including the WAL file at level L0 and
SSTables at levels L≥1. Inside the enclave, it runs the codebase of an
LSM store and stores the intermediate data including indices and data
buffers. The system architecture of eLSM-P1 is depicted in Figure 1.
We implement a functional system prototype of eLSM-P1 on
Google’s LevelDB [18]. To port Google LevelDB to SGX, we use
Intel SGX SDK and modify the LevelDB codebase to call SDK’s
syscalls.
Security analysis: eLSM-P1 provides security on data
confidentiality and authenticity through SGX SDK’s data-protection
mechanism. That is, SDK encrypts and digests the content of SSTable
files stored outside the enclave, which ensures that an adversary host
cannot extract information from the file content (in the ciphertext
format) and forge a file block (whose integrity is verified by the hash
proof of file block). Note that we do not address the confidentiality
under side-channel attacks in SGX.
4.2 Performance Analysis of eLSM-P1
In this subsection, we first present a performance analysis of
eLSM-P1 that identifies performance problem serving a large
dataset. We then use this observation to motivate our next design,
eLSM-P2.
Observing eLSM-P1’s performance: We first focus on analyzing
the read path of eLSM-P1. Recall that on the read path of an LSM
store, the CPU accesses disk-resident data by buffering it in memory.
eLSM-P1 places the read buffers inside enclave, which may cause
two performance problems: S1) The buffer in enclave incurs an extra
data copy in the data-read path, that is, when the CPU accesses the
data already buffered inside the untrusted memory, it creates a second
data copy inside enclave. S2) When the in-enclave buffer grows large
(e.g., beyond 128MB), it causes expensive enclave paging. For the
common setting of disk-resident data, having a large read buffer is
essential to the performance.
In order to quantify the performance slowdown caused by the
in-enclave read buffer placement, we conduct a performance study
based on our eLSM-P1 implementation. For comparison, we also
implement the placement of read buffer outside enclave. This is done
by allocating the read buffer of LSM store in the untrusted memory. In
the performance study, we store 5 GB dataset (larger than untrusted
memory) and drive a read-only workload that consists of reads of
randomly distributed data keys. We vary the read buffer size 4MB to
2048 MB. The read latency is reported in Figure 2.
4 8 16 32 64 128 200 400 600 800 1000 1500 2000
Buffer size (MB)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
L
a
te
n
c
y
 p
e
r 
o
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
 (
m
ic
ro
 s
e
c
o
n
d
s
)
Buffer outside enclave 
Buffer inside enclave (eLSM-P1)
Figure 2: Placing read buffers inside/outside enclave and their
performance difference
The results show that when the data buffer is small, the in-enclave
buffer incurs 2X latency of the out-enclave buffer. This performance
difference is caused by the extra data copy in enclave (S1). When
the data buffer is larger beyond 64 MB, the latency of accessing
in-enclave buffer grows significantly and it incurs 4.5X latency. The
performance slowdown of the large in-enclave buffer is due to the
expensive enclave paging. This performance characteristic prompts
us to place the memory buffers of an LSM store outside the enclave.
Motivating eLSM-P2 Design: The above performance
observation suggests a favorable design by placing the read
buffer of an LSM store outside the enclave. We propose eLSM-P2
as a holistic system that materializes the design of placing read buffer
outside the enclave. The eLSM-P2 system features two placement
strategies, that is, placing read buffer outside enclave and placing
code and other memory (meta)data inside enclave.
Concretely, in eLSM-P2, the code of an LSM store runs inside
the enclave, and it switches the execution out of the enclave only
when serving system calls (e.g., file reads/writes). The enclave code
accesses the data on the read path outside enclave, which includes
read buffers and disk files. Other memory data is placed inside
enclave, including the write buffer (at level L0) and file indices (at
levels L≥1). A common characteristic of data inside enclave is
that they are meta-data in memory whose sizes are small enough
(e.g., with file indices of a couple of megabytes, it can accommodate
millions of files) and thus they can be safely placed in enclave without
causing enclave paging. eLSM-P2 places only static memory data,
that is, read buffers outside enclave, which significantly simplifies the
complexity of a correct implementation. Table 1 summarizes design
choices made in eLSM-P1 and eLSM-P2.
5. eLSM-P2 SYSTEM
Table 1: Design choices of eLSM-P1 and eLSM-P2
Code placement Data placement Digest structure
eLSM-P1 (§ 4.1) Inside enclave Inside enclave File granularity
eLSM-P2 (§ 5) Inside enclave Outside enclave Record granularity
5.1 System Overview
Figure 3a depicts the system architecture of eLSM-P2 which runs
the code for operations PUT,GET,COMPACTION inside enclave. The
memory data including the buffer at Level L0 and file indices at
Levels L≥1 are also placed inside the enclave. The read buffers and
all SSTable files at Levels L≥1 are placed outside the enclave. The
WAL file is also stored outside enclave. The figure also illustrates
the dataset in the LSM store, which we will use throughout this
section to describe the details of eLSM-P2 system. In this example
dataset, there is an LSM tree of three levels and six key-value
records. Level L1 contains record 〈A, 9〉, level L2 contains three
records 〈T, 4〉, 〈Z, 7〉, 〈Z, 6〉 and level L3 contains four records
〈A, 2〉, 〈T, 0〉, 〈Y, 3〉, 〈Z, 1〉. Here, we show the key-value record
by its data key and timestamp. Record 〈T, 0〉 is of data key T and
timestamp 0, which is the oldest record. For simplicity, the data value
is omitted in this example.
Protecting data outside enclave: Because eLSM-P2 places
outside enclave the data at non-zero levels, it entails data protection
mechanisms. For data confidentiality, we require the data key in each
record to be encrypted with deterministic encryption (DE), such that
it can directly search the domain of ciphertext. We discuss the details
of data confidentiality in § 5.6.2. For data authenticity, we build the
eLSM digest structure to authenticate the data outside enclave, as
described next.
5.2 Digest Structure
To digest an LSM tree, we propose a novel authenticated data
structure, eLSM-P2 digests. There are two key designs: 1)
eLSM-P2 builds a “forest” of Merkle trees, each digesting one
LSM-tree level and each having its root stored in the enclave. 2)
In a per-level Merkle tree, data records of the same key are digested
in hash chains and records of different keys are digested in a Merkle
tree. In particular, the hash chain is built in a temporal order where
the chain header is the oldest record and the tail is the newest
record. In Figure 3a, each of the three LSM tree levels is associated
with a Merkle tree. Case 1): For a level of distinct data keys,
such as level L3 in Figure 3a, it builds the leaf set of the Merkle
tree directly on the data records. For instance, h7 = H(〈A, 2〉)
(H is a standard cryptographic hash algorithm with variable-length
input) and h6 = H(〈T, 0〉). An intermediate node is the hash
digest of the concatenation of the two children, for instance, h8 =
H(h6‖h7). Case 2) For a level that contains some records of the
same keys, it constructs a hash chain over these records. For instance,
level L2 contains two records of the same key, 〈Z, 7〉 and 〈Z, 6〉.
eLSM-P2 builds a hash chain on these two records, that is, h4 =
H(〈Z, 7〉‖H(〈Z, 6〉)). Then, it builds the Merkle tree over h4 (for
records of key Z) and h2 (for record 〈T, 4〉) for level L2.
To materialize the eLSM-P2 digest structure, we present a simple
storage design: Given a level Li and its Merkle tree, each record
at the level 〈k, v〉 is augmented with its eLSM-P2 proof pi, that is,
〈k, v‖pii〉 Given a record, an eLSM-P2 proof is the set of Merkle
tree nodes (or hashes) that surround the path from the leaf node of
the record to the root node. For instance, in Figure 3a, the eLSM-P2
proof for record 〈A, 2〉 consists of hashes h7 and h11 (which are the
siblings to nodes h6 and h8).
5.3 Read/Write Protocol
Data read path starts with the trusted application issuing a read
operation, v = GET(k). The enclave looks up its index to locate
the target level and file, and it then notifies the eLSM-P2 store. r1
The untrusted store serves the read operation on the target file and,
in addition, runs algorithm pi, v = QUERYGET(m, k)) to prepare a
proof for authenticating the read result. The proof consists of Merkle
authentication paths or Merkle proofs [59] at “relevant” LSM tree
levels. Recall that a Merkle authentication path consists of the hashes
surrounding the path from a leaf to the root in a Merkle tree and
it can be used to verify the membership and non-membership of a
record in a dataset. r2 The eLSM-P2 store in the untrusted host
then sends the result of GET (k) as well as the proofs (pi) to the
enclave. The enclave verifies the authenticity of the read result,
by running algorithm Yes|No= VRFYGET(pi, v)). The verification
algorithm iterates through relevant levels, and, for each level, verifies
the membership/non-membership of the queried data key (k) using
the Merkle proof (in pi) and locally stored root hash.
A strawman of designing the eLSM-P2 proof is to scan all levels
to prepare a proof (in algorithm QUERY). We propose to reduce
the proof size by including only Merkle proofs of the levels no
higher than the level of the result record. This will allow algorithm
QUERY to stop early when it reaches the first level, say Li, that
finds a matching record. The returned proof pi = pi1, ...pii, where
pi1, ...pii−1 are the Merkle proofs for non-membership (there is not
any matching record at levels L1, L2, ...Li−1). pii is the Merkle proof
for membership (there is a matching record at level Li). All Merkle
proofs after level Li, as will be seen, do not contain fresher records
and are deliberately omitted. When there is no matching record,
i = q.
An example: In Figure 3a, suppose the trusted application issues
GET(Z) over dataset m. In step r1 , the untrusted host serves
QUERYGET(m,Z) with authentic result 〈Z, 7〉 (the benign case).
〈Z, 7〉 is the newest record matching queried key Z and is located
at level L2. The proof is two Merkle authentication paths at levels
L1 and L2. Note that there is no need to include level L3 in the
eLSM-P2 proof. Concretely, the proof at the first level is 〈A, 9〉
(denoted by pi1). The proof at the second level is h3, h2 (denoted
by pi2). Then in step r2 , the enclave can verify the result authenticity
in freshness and completeness based on the proof pi = [pi1, pi2] (i.e.,
algorithm VRFY([pi1, pi2], 〈Z, 7〉, [h1, h5])).
Concretely, with the first-level proof pi1 = 〈A, 9〉, the enclave
verifies result authenticity by checking H(pi1)
?
= h5. If the VRFY
algorithm runs through, it authenticates the fact that record 〈A, 9〉 is
the only record at level L1. From this, it can be derived that level L1
does not contain any record of key Z (i.e., the non-membership of a
data key Z at level L1). With the second-level proof pi2 = h3, h2,
the enclave verifies by checking H(h2‖H(〈Z, 7〉‖h3))
?
= h5. If
successful, it authenticates the fact that a) record 〈Z, 7〉 is a valid
record at level L2 (result integrity), b) record 〈Z, 7〉 is the newest
record with key Z (result freshness). Fact b) is based on that there are
no other records of key Z in the proof pi2. Based on these two proofs,
one can establish that record 〈Z, 7〉 is the newest record in the dataset
m.
Consider the malicious case when the untrusted host can return a
stale record, say 〈Z, 6〉, to the enclave. In this case, the malicious
host can only present the following as a valid level-L2 proof, that is,
pi′2 = 〈Z, 7〉, h2. By this means, the enclave can verify the result
integrity successfully by checking H(h2‖H(〈Z, 7〉‖H(〈Z, 6〉)))
?
=
h5. However, as the newer result record 〈Z, 7〉 has to be included in
the proof pi2, the enclave can detect that 〈Z, 6〉 is not the most fresh
record (violating freshness).
Data write path starts with the trusted application issuing a write
operation PUT(k, v). To serve the write, the enclave maintains two
in-enclave structures, a write buffer of level L0 and, for data recovery,
a digest of the write-ahead log (WAL). Recall that a WAL stores
recent data writes in temporal order and serves as the base to recover
recent data in the case of fault. The storage of WAL is placed outside
the enclave, while the enclave stores the hash digests of the WAL.
w1 Serving the write PUT (k,v), the enclave first assigns to
the record to write the latest timestamp ts. It then writes to the
memory buffer of level L0 inside enclave. Serving a timestamped
write PUT(k, v, ts), the enclave iteratively update its WAL digest
by dig′ = H(dig‖〈k, v, ts〉). w2 When the write buffer at level
L0 overflows, it is triggered to flush the content at Level L0 and
to generate a file at Level L1. In the system of an LSM store, the
codebase for flush is shared with that for COMPACTION. w3 The
enclave switches out to append the write to the WAL in the untrusted
domain. Enclave WAL can be extended to defend rollback attacks,
which will be described in § 5.6.1.
An example: In Figure 3a, suppose the application calls PUT(Y ).
The enclave assigns to the record the latest timestamp 10. It updates
the WAL digest from dig to dig’, such that dig′ = H(dig‖〈Y, 10〉))
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Figure 3: eLSM-P2 system with an LSM tree of three levels: A rectangle depicts data and a rounded rectangle depicts code. Shapes in red are
where eLSM-P2 makes code change over the original LSM store. The root hashes (red dots in green boxes) are maintained with copies inside
enclave.
( w1 ). The host appends the record to the WAL outside enclave ( w3 ).
If the buffer of Level L0 is overflown by the new record, it will sort
all records stored in L0, and flush them to a new file at L1 ( w2 ).
COMPACTION path starts with the trusted application in enclave
issuing operation (L′i, L
′
i+1) = COMPACTION(Li, Li+1). For
simplicity, we consider the most basic form of COMPACTION,
namely, merging two adjacent levels. It is natural to extend it to
more complicated cases such as merging more than two levels or
merging subsets at the two levels. For the COMPACTION across two
levels, eLSM-P2 carries out the computation inside enclave and only
switches the execution outside enclave for file access. The process
runs in the following steps: m1 the enclave starts to issue OCalls to
load all input files to untrusted memory so that the enclave can read
the streams of data records (in their sorted order). m2 The enclave
then runs “authenticated COMPACTION” that merges input data at
the two levels into one level. Internally, the enclave needs to verify
the authenticity of input data, to conduct the actual computation for
COMPACTION, to produce the digest of output data, and to generate
the proofs embedded in the output data. We will describe in § 5.5.2
the detailed system design of the authenticated COMPACTION in
enclave. m3 The untrusted host makes effect of the COMPACTION
by flushing merged data and proof to disk. The enclave updates the
per-level digests by the newly produced ones.
An example: In Figure 3a, suppose the application calls
COMPACTION(L2, L3). In step m1 , the host loads the data at the two
levels from disk to memory (in the untrusted world). In step m2 , the
enclave verifies the data authenticity of input levels by reconstructing
the Merkle tree at level L2 (and L3) and by checking if its root
hash is equal with h5 (and h12). It will then merge the two levels’
data into one merged list, that is, from L2 = [〈T, 4〉, 〈Z, 7〉, 〈Z, 6〉]
and L3 = [〈A, 2〉, 〈T, 0〉, 〈Y, 3〉, 〈Z, 1〉] to output level L
′
3 =
[〈A, 2〉, 〈T, 4〉, 〈T, 0〉, 〈Y, 3〉, 〈Z, 7〉, 〈Z, 6〉, 〈Z, 1〉]. Meanwhile, it
builds the Merkle tree over the output list, and based on it, generates
the proofs embedded in data records. In step m3 , the digest of the
new Merkle tree replaces that of level L3 (i.e., h12). L2 becomes an
empty list and its digest is updated as well.
5.3.1 Protocol Analysis
In this subsection we present the security analysis of the eLSM-P2
protocol. We first define the record freshness as below:
DEFINITION 5.1. (Record freshness) Given 〈k, v, ts〉 =
GET(k,m), GET returns a fresh result if the record 〈k, v, ts〉 is the
newest one (i.e., with the largest timestamp) in the dataset m that
matches data key k.
The protocol correctness is defined as below:
DEFINITION 5.2. (Protocol correctness) Given any state of
datasetm, if a GET returns a correct and fresh record w.r.t. statem,
the VRFY algorithm will complete successfully (i.e., returning Yes).
The protocol security is defined as below:
THEOREM 5.3. (Protocol security) Given a GET operation, if the
enclave completes the VRFY algorithm successfully, the GET result
is correct and fresh (as in Definition 5.1).
Security analysis: We prove the protocol security by
contradiction. Assume there exists an adversary who can forge
a proof on a stale (yet correct)6 record on which the VRFY algorithm
completes successfully. Logically, there are two cases for a stale
record: 1) The record is stale at the level that contains it, 2) The
record is fresh at the level that contains it but there are more fresh
records at other levels. In the following, we prove the contradiction
that the VRFY algorithm successfully completes on a stale record,
respectively in the two cases.
For Case 1), suppose there is another record 〈k, v′, ts′〉 on the
same level with result record 〈k, v, ts〉 but fresher, that is, ts < ts′.
The COMPACTION in enclave guarantees7 that the two records are
sorted by timestamps (note that they are of the same data key) and
6The record integrity or correctness can be easily authenticated by
the cryptographic hashes.
7We assume program security in this work that the enclave program
does not have exploitable bugs or run malware.
the eLSM-P2 builds a hash chain over them. More specifically,
H(〈k, v′, ts′〉‖...H(〈k, v, ts〉‖...)). In other words, the fresh record
〈k, v′, ts′〉 is among the neighbors of the path from the stale record
〈k, v, ts〉 to the Merkle root node (think for an example, 〈Z, 7〉 is the
neighbor of the path from 〈Z, 6〉 to root as in Figure 3b). In order
for the adversary to forge a proof that can be verified successfully,
she either breaks the security of cryptographic hashes (1a) or has to
include all the neighbors of the path from itself to the root (1b). The
former case (1a) is hard to any computationally bounded adversary
(more formally, probabilistic polynomial time adversary). In the latter
case (1b), the fresher record included in the neighbors is exposed
to the enclave who will not pass the freshness check in the VRFY
algorithm as it can simply detect that the result record is not fresh
(e.g., 〈Z, 7〉 has a larger timestamp and is fresher than 〈Z, 6〉).
Therefore, the VRFY algorithm cannot complete successfully on a
stale record. A contradiction is found in Case 1.
For Case 2), suppose the result record 〈k, v, ts〉 resides at level Li
and there exists a fresher record 〈k, v′, ts′〉 stored at another level
Lj . There are two cases: 2a) j < i and 2b) j > i. For Case
2a), successfully passing VRFY algorithm in eLSM-P2, it requires
a non-membership proof of data key k at level Lj . This contradicts
the assumption that Lj does contain a record of key k, namely
〈k, v′, ts′〉. For Case 2b), eLSM-P2 does not require including any
proof for the levels with index higher than i (recall that given a GET
result residing at level Li, an eLSM-P2 proof includes Merkle proofs
for levels L1, L2, ...Li but excludes the ones on any higher levels
Li+1, Li+2, ...). The following lemma guarantees that those levels
higher than Li (i.e., with larger index values) cannot include any
records fresher than 〈k, v, ts〉.
LEMMA 5.4. In eLSM-P2 with the in-enclave COMPACTION, a
record residing at a lower level must have a larger timestamp than
any record of the same data key at a higher level. That is, given any
two records of the same data key, say 〈k, v, ts〉 residing at level Li
and 〈k, v′, ts′〉 at level Li′ , it holds that i < i
′ if and only if ts > ts′.
For instance, in Figure 3a, at any level, say L3, records are sorted,
from key A to T to Z. Lemma 5.4 requires that in Figure 3a, an older
record A with timestamp 2 is stored on a higher level L3 than the
level a newer record 〈A, 9〉 is stored (which is level L1). To prove
Lemma 5.4, the key intuition is that eLSM-P2 only allows moving
key-value records from lower levels to higher levels, but not in the
reversed order.
Meta-data authenticity: In our implementation, meta-data
including Bloom filters, file indices, etc. are placed inside enclaves.
The metadata authenticity is protected by the enclave.
5.4 Range Query and Deletes
Processing Range Query: eLSM-P2 supports range query
processing with completeness. Given a queried key range, it iterates
through all levels (unlike the case of exact-match query) and for each
level, the untrusted world presents the range-query proof from the
Merkle tree at the level.
Within one level, the range proof is constructed by treating the
Merkle tree as a segment tree which is a classic data structure in
computational geometry. A segment tree is essentially a full binary
tree where each intermediate tree node represents a segment (or
interval of data keys). Given a range query L, the segment tree can
present 2 logL intermediate nodes, whose segments are union-ed to
cover range L [60]. Based on this view, eLSM constructs a range
proof by the sibling nodes of the segments covering the queried range.
For instance, suppose in Figure 3, a range query is SCAN([S,U ])
against Level L3. The query proof will include 1) records which fall
in or enclose the range, that is, 〈T, 0〉, 〈Y, 3〉, 〈Z, 1〉, 2) the range
proof that authenticates these records, that is, h6. At level L3, the
segment union that covers the three records includes intermediate tree
nodes h11 and h7. Their siblings are h6 and h8. While h8 can be
reconstructed from 〈T, 0〉 and h6, it can be omitted, leave the range
proof to be h6. In this case, a query verifier can authenticate the query
completeness, as records 〈T, 0〉, 〈Y, 3〉, 〈Z, 1〉 are authenticated and
they consecutive in the leaf set of the Merkle tree.
Security Analysis (Range Completeness): The range-query proof
authenticates query completeness. Informally, the security can be
derived from the following facts: 1) The hash functions used in
Merkle tree are collision resistant. 2) The data records in a level are
sorted by data keys. 3) The records in the query proof form a range
of data keys that cover the range in the query.
Handling Deletes: eLSM relies on the underlying LSM store
to support delete operations. Briefly, a delete operation stores a
so-called tombstone record in the LSM store, which triggers the next
COMPACTION call to physically drop the records of the same key
being merged. Before the COMPACTION, a GET operation may return
the tombstone record which is interpreted by eLSM as “no record”.
5.5 System Implementation
We have implemented eLSM-P2 on Google LevelDB [18] and
Facebook RocksDB [19]. For LevelDB, eLSM is implemented
by directly changing the LevelDB codebase. This implementation
approach has the advantage in performance. For RocksDB, eLSM is
implemented as a RocksDB add-on, that is, without code changes
to RocksDB. In this subsection, we present the LevelDB-based
implementation in § 5.5.1, 5.5.2 and the RocksDB implementation
in § 5.5.3.
In the protocol of eLSM-P2, a key-value record is stored with its
proof, that is, 〈k, v‖pii〉, where i is the index of the level where the
record is currently located. To implement the embedded proof in an
LSM store, it is required to add the code change in two paths, that
is, a) the COMPACTION paths for updating records’ proof when they
are merged to a different level (Note that the proof is sensitive to
which level the record is located), and b) the GET path where the
proof is used to authenticate the record membership/non-membership
in a level. Next, we present the code change on the GET path in
§ 5.5.1, and then present that on the COMPACTION path in § 5.5.2.
5.5.1 Query Verification in Read Path
The code change on the GET path serves two purposes: First,
for the data stored in the untrusted world, eLSM-P2 needs to
present non-membership proofs for the levels that do not have a
matching record. Instead of returning null for non-membership
levels, eLSM-P2 returns the two neighboring records whose keys are
smaller and larger than the queried key. For instance, in Figure 3a,
when it queries GET(k = B) on level L3, it returns records 〈A, 2〉
and 〈T, 0〉 (with their eLSM-P2 proofs).
Second, inside the enclave, eLSM-P2 requires implementing the
VRFY algorithm to verify the query authenticity given a proof. Note
that the proof can be directly extracted from the result record returned
from the untrusted part of eLSM-P2.
Support mmap reads: LevelDB supports the data reads in two
ways: Read through a user-space read buffer and read through
mmap’ed files. eLSM implementation over LevelDB supports both
read paths in LevelDB. On the buffer-based read path, eLSM-P2
allows the enclave code to access the buffer outside the enclave
and let the untrusted code manage the buffer for eviction. On the
mmap-based read path, it switches out of the enclave, upon opening a
file, to mmap the file to the untrusted memory. Then the enclave code
directly accesses the mmap’ed file in the untrusted memory.
5.5.2 Authenticated COMPACTION
Recall that eLSM-P2 runs the COMPACTION computation inside
the enclave by accessing data from the untrusted world. For data
authenticity, the in-enclave COMPACTION needs to be augmented
with three extra steps: a) Before the COMPACTION, the enclave
authenticates the input data read from the untrusted world. b) After
the COMPACTION, the enclave needs to digest the output data and
store the digest in the enclave. c) In the end, it generates from the
output Merkle tree the proofs embedded in individual data records.
Integrating the COMPACTION authentication with the
underlying LSM store (i.e., LevelDB and RocksDB) is realized
by event handling. Concretely, the compaction process in an
LSM store triggers various internal events. Two events are of
particular interest to our implementation, that is, Filter()
and OnTableFileCreated(). Event Filter() occurs
whenever the compaction produces a data record. Event
OnTableFileCreated() occurs whenever the compaction
(or other procedure like flush) produces a new file on disk. In
RocksDB, these two events are exposed in its callback functions
(as will be described in details). In LevelDB, we have to modify
the LevelDB codebase to expose the events (i.e., adding hooks)
to applications. The pseudo-code that implements authenticated
COMPACTION by the two callbacks is depicted in Figure 4.
eLSM-P2 runs the codebase of LSM store and the implemented
callback functions in enclave. Steps a) and b): In Filter(), it
constructs two types of Merkle trees, respectively for the input files
and the output file. Given a key-value record, it parses the file name
and level information from the value field and then updates the input
Merkle tree at the corresponding level (Line 20 in Figure 4). It also
builds an output Merkle tree for the level the compaction output
is located (Line 21). When the compaction finishes, it checks the
equality of the Merkle root hash stored in enclave and the root hashes
of the input Merkle trees reconstructed. If the equality check passes,
the Merkle root hash for the output file takes effect (Line 36-39).
Step c): In OnTableFileCreated(), it embeds the Merkle
proof in the individual data records in the output file.
Merkle tree construction: Constructing a Merkle tree is a
primitive operation in eLSM-P2, specifically for authenticating the
input and output of a COMPACTION. The Merkle tree in our
scheme is constructed incrementally with the arrival of records in the
input/output data stream. That is, when a data record arrives, the
enclave checks if the record shares the data key with the previous
record. If this is the case, the enclave builds a hash chain on the
previous record. Otherwise, it will incrementally build a Merkle tree.
For instance, in Figure 3b, upon reading the output record 〈T, 4〉, the
enclave checks if the previous record (i.e., 〈T, 0〉) has the same data
key. Since the two records are of the same key, it then builds a hash
chain over them. In the next iteration when the output record 〈Y, 3〉
arrives, the previous record (i.e., 〈T, 4〉) has a different data key, it
then treats as a leaf of the Merkle tree the hash of previous record,
namely h3.
Our implementation retains the COMPACTION features in the
vanilla LSM store, including versioning policies, tombstone delete,
etc.
Multi-threading: eLSM-P2 supports concurrent operations in a
multi-threaded enclave. For concurrent reads/writes in MemTable at
Level L0, eLSM-P2 implementation relies on the synchronization
support (i.e., mutex and condition variables) in enclave provided by
Intel SGX SDK [61]. Concurrent reads on upper levels L≥1 can be
processed in parallel without synchronization.
Concurrent COMPACTION with reads/writes needs to be
synchronized, as is in LevelDB. For instance, when an SSTable
produced by a COMPACTION replaces an old SSTable at the same
level, the replacement operation needs to be synchronized with
any pending read on the old file. This type of synchronization in
eLSM-P2 is realized by checks during query verification VRFY,
such that a read before/after the file replacement can only be verified
successfully with the Merkle hash of the old/new SSTable file. To
implement this, the file replacement outside enclave synchronously
calls into the enclave (through a blocking ECall) in order to
update the file hash maintained inside the enclave. When a GET
operation returns (which is potentially executed in parallel with
a COMPACTION), the enclave verifies its result against the latest
file hash (updated by the COMPACTION) in the enclave. We use
an in-enclave mutex to guard the file hash under concurrent hash
1 Record prev_r; Hash prev_h;
2 MHT[] input_mhts; MHT output_mht;
3
4 void MHT_add(Record r, MHT mht) {
5 if (prev_r == NULL) h=H(r);
6 else if (r.datakey != prev_r.datakey) {
7 h=H(r);
8 mht.add_leaf(prev_h);
9 } else h=H(prev_h||r);
10 prev_r = r; prev_h = h;}
11
12 void vanilla_compaction(SSTable La, SSTable Lb,
13 int filter(Record a)
14 int onTableFileCreated(SSTable f));
15
16 void auth_filter(Record r) {
17 MHT_add(r, input_mhts[parseFile(r)]);
18 MHT_add(r, output_mht);}
19
20 int auth_onTableFileCreated(SSTable f)){
21 SSTable f_new;
22 for(record r : f){
23 r.addEmbeddedProof(output_mht);
24 f_new.write(r);}
25 f = f_new;}
26
27 void auth_compaction(SSTable La, SSTable Lb){
28 vanilla_compaction(La, Lb,
29 auth_filter, auth_onTableFileCreated);
30 //check digest equality on input and then sign
31 if(input_mhts[La].roothash == La.roothash &&
32 input_mhts[Lb].roothash == Lb.roothash)
33 Lb.roothash = output_mht.roothash;}
Figure 4: Authenticated COMPACTION in eLSM
updates (from file replacement in a COMPACTION) and hash reads
(for verifying a GET operation).
5.5.3 Implementation as a RocksDB Add-on
The eLSM-P2 implementation on LevelDB requires the change
of LevelDB’s codebase. A more modular approach (with benefits in
easy maintenance and deployment, etc.) is to implement eLSM-P2
without the code change of underlying LSM stores. For this reason,
we present the second implementation on RocksDB.
Comparing with LevelDB, the system of RocksDB exposes
callbacks through which application programs can listen to and
handle RocksDB’s internal events. Different RocksDB events
exposed occur at the granularity of level, file, record, etc. The
callback API is similar to stored procedures (supported in commercial
database systems) and is widely available in other LSM stores (e.g.,
HBase Coprocessor [62]).
The RocksDB-based eLSM is implemented as a series of
event handlers. 1) As previously described, the authenticated
COMPACTION is implemented as handlers for events Filter and
OnTableFileCreated. The former event is triggered every time
the underlying RocksDB encounters a key-value record during a
COMPACTION, and the latter is when a new file is written to the
disk. 2) The embedded proof on RocksDB is extended to cover not
only the Merkle proof at the current file, but also all Merkle proofs
at the current level and previous non-hit levels. The Merkle proofs
at non-hit levels are for the non-membership. 3) To implement the
authenticated flush, it wraps the code for digesting a MemTable in
the iterator (i.e., next()) exposed by a pluggable MemTable [63].
5.6 Discussion
5.6.1 Freshness and Rollback Attacks
In a rollback attack, the untrusted host can replace the authenticated
data storage with an older but also authenticated version. To
detect and defend the rollback attack, we can harden the security
of eLSM systems (both eLSM-P1 and eLSM-P2) with a trusted
monotonic counter. A trusted monotonic counter provides the
state freshness across power cycles. In reality, one can build
a trusted monotonic counter on TPM chips (e.g., the SDK
sgx_create_monotonic_counter service [64] or others [65,
66] based on Intel Management Engine (ME) [67]) or multiple remote
enclaves (e.g., as in ROTE [66]). Given a trusted monotonic counter,
the eLSM would periodically write the hash of current dataset across
all levels to the counter. This hash can be implemented by the static
hash of all non-zero levels (updated only when it merges) and the
hash of WAL file. By this means, one can guarantee the freshness
of entire dataset across power cycles against rollback attacks. The
dataset-wide freshness can derive the query freshness.
To reduce the performance impact, one can allocate a write buffer
for logging the monotonic counter. The size of the write buffer is
tunable by system administrator.
5.6.2 Data Confidentiality
eLSM can be extended to support data confidentiality for
applications of the need (e.g., outsourcing sensitive data to the cloud).
This is handled by building an encryption layer on eLSM. While
the values can be encrypted using the standard semantically-secure
schemes (e.g., AES), the data keys need to be encrypted in a
searchable fashion. We follow the common approach of using
searchable encryption schemes [68], which is adopted in CryptDB
and other searchable databases [69, 70]. In our design, the key
of a data record is deterministic-encrypted (DE) [71, 72]. The use
of DE allows for querying the ciphertext in the untrusted world.
In our system implementation, we used the Intel SDK function
SGX_RIJNDAEL128GCM_ENCRYPT [27]. For range query, one
can use Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE) [73, 74] to encrypt
the data keys. In existing work, data confidentiality in encrypted
key-value stores is treated in an ad-hoc fashion (e.g., Speicher [32]
is an encrypted LSM store where the correlation of block index
and query is disclosed) or by more formal security protocols, e.g.,
Oblivious RAM, at a higher cost [75].
5.7 Case Studies
Our eLSM can be integrated with existing systems for general
transparency and cryptocurrency. Here we focus on describing the
case of integrating eLSM with Google’s Certificate Transparency
(CT) system [42].
A vanilla CT protocol involves with three actors, log servers,
log auditors and log monitors. Log servers collect newly issued
certificates (from the certificates authorities or CAs). A log auditor
running along with a web browser needs to validate the certificate
being used by the browser. Given a certificate, the log auditor
queries the log server for a proof of inclusion (or membership) of the
certificate in the CT log. A log monitor run by a domain owner needs
to monitor all certificates and to detect any certificates misissued
under her domain name. A log monitor continuously send queries
to the log server and downloads all certificates.
With eLSM, one can build a trustworthy and efficient CT log
server, which provides query authenticity and fork prevention, yet
without the overhead incurred in the vanilla CT log server. More
specifically, it eliminates the cost of running multiple log servers
and does not need to gossip. The eLSM scheme can enable
lightweight log monitors who only download the certificates of their
own domain names, resulting low and sublinear bandwidth. In
addition, with eLSM and a secure enclave, one can safely delegate the
log-monitoring logic to the enclave, which relieves low-power clients
(like web browser running on mobile phones) from the cumbersome
auditing work.
We have built a prototype of eLSM-based log server. In our
implementation, we download certificates from the Google CT log
server8 and store them in eLSM by key-value records: The hostname
of a certificate is used as the data key and the certificate itself (more
specifically, the hash of the certificate) is the data value. eLSM
receives GET queries from a log auditor and continuously monitors
8
https://ct.googleapis.com/pilot
the certificate of interest (e.g., of a particular hostname). eLSM
provides query authenticity and freshness which is essential for
trusted log auditing.
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of eLSM-P2
and eLSM-P1 using YCSB benchmarking tools [33].
6.1 Experiment Design and Setup
Setup: In our experiments, we use a laptop equipped with an
SGX CPU. Specifically, the hardware specs include an Intel 8-core
i7-6820HK CPU of 2.70 GHz with 8 MB cache, a 16 GB RAM and
1 TB disk.
We run our experiments in the YCSB framework [33]. We use
YCSB to both generate the workload and to execute the experiments.
YCSB framework works in two phases: the load phase when it
initializes the system by populating the dataset, and the evaluation
phase when it drives the target workload to the system and measures
the performance. When initializing each experiment, we typically
scan the loaded dataset so that it is loaded in the untrusted memory.
By this means, we mainly consider the setting of memory-resident
data with size ranging from several hundreds of megabytes to four
gigabytes (that is, millions of records, each with a 16-byte key
and 100-byte value by default). With such small record size, four
gigabytes is the maximal data size that we can tolerate in experiment
time.
We port the open-source LevelDB-YCSB adapter [76] to the SGX
architecture. This is done by running the YCSB platform in the
untrusted world and wrap each PUT/GET request as an ECall (as in
SGX SDK) into the enclave. Inside the enclave, we run the YCSB
measurement code that measures various performance metrics.
Baseline: Eleos: We implement a baseline of an in-memory
data store. In this in-memory store, the entire dataset is stored
in enclave as a sorted array. To make data update efficient, we
leave 30% of the array space empty to accomodate data insertions
without moving existing data. For implementation, we use Eleos [30],
a state-of-the-art virtual memory management engine in enclave
without calling expensive enclave paging. Their approach, briefly,
is to monitor all memory references and to relocate data between
enclave and untrusted memory. We implement a sorted array in
enclave linked with Eleos. The array serves data reads with binary
search and is updated “in place”. For fair comparison, the data in
Eleos is persisted to disk periodically. This is done by maintaining
a write buffer storing recent data updates and switching out enclave
(through an OCall) for data persistence on disk.
6.2 Overall Performance under YCSB
(Macro-benchmark)
We present the performance result of eLSM under YCSB. In this
set of experiments, we vary the workloads in terms read-write ratio,
key distribution, etc. and evaluate eLSM performance. The purpose
is to present a holistic view regarding the performance of eLSM-P1
and eLSM-P2.
To conduct the experiments, we fix the initial dataset at 3 GB.
In the evaluation phase, we drive millions of operations to the
key-value store for performance measurement. We use the uniform
distribution to generate the dataset and queries. We turn on the
default compaction strategy. By this means, we conduct a series
of experiments with varying the read-write ratio of the workload.
Each experiment is run for three times and the average performance
metric and standard deviation are reported. The operation latency of
eLSM-P1 and eLSM-P2 under varying read-write ratios are shown
in Figure 5a. The result shows that eLSM-P2 outperforms eLSM-P1
in most workloads except for a small set of write-only workloads.
Specifically, as the workload becomes more read intensive, eLSM-P2
(with the mmap configuration as described in § 5.5.1) has its operation
latency decreased. This performance characteristic is due to that
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Figure 5: Performance of eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1 under YCSB workloads
eLSM-P2 has to cause disk IO for data persistence on the write path
while on the read path it can read the memory (through the mmap
files). As the workload transitions from writes to reads, eLSM-P1’s
latency first increases and then decreases near the end. The increase
of latency is caused by overflowing the enclave memory (of 128 MB)
and enclave paging, as will be validated in other experiments (e.g., in
Figure 6a). In addition, compared with the ideal approach (running
an unsecured LevelDB), the slowdown caused by eLSM-P2 ranges
between 1.5× and 4X .
Comparing eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1, when the workload is
write-only, eLSM-P1 is faster. For most workloads, eLSM-P2 has
a smaller operation latency than eLSM-P1, and the performance
discrepancy reaches the highest when the workload consists of
70% reads (Note the uniform key distribution in this workload).
In this setting, eLSM-P2 achieves 4.5X performance speedup
comparing eLSM-P1. This performance result clearly supports the
design tradeoff made in eLSM-P1 and eLSM-P2, where eLSM-P2
optimizes the read path by placing the read buffer outside enclave and
avoiding enclave paging, which inevitably causes the write overhead,
including authenticating COMPACTION and embedding eLSM-P2
proofs in the software layer. eLSM-P1 does not have such write
overhead (data security is provided by the hardware-level memory
protection in SGX). From the performance result, it can be seen that
the eLSM-P2’s design to trade off write performance for read is
worthwhile, as the majority of workloads favors eLSM-P2.
The second experiment is to report the operation latency under
varying data sizes. We initialize the system with data of varying
sizes from 0.6 GB to 3 GB. In the evaluation phase, we drive into
the system YCSB workload A which consists of 50% reads and 50%
writes with data keys generated following a Zipfian distribution. We
measure the operation latency for eLSM-P2 (in mmap configuration),
eLSM-P1 and the baseline of Eleos. The result is shown in
Figure 5b. With the increasing data sizes, Eleos can scale only to
1 GB data which is limited by their open-source project [77, 30].
The discrepancy between the latency of eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1
increases, which reaches a maximal of 7X difference when the data
size is 3 GB.
Figure 5c presents the operation latency when the workload is
generated with different key distributions. YCSB provides three
common distribution for generating data keys, that is, Uniform,
Zipfian and Latest. Among the three, Latest is the key distribution
that has the best temporal locality (as it tends to read the latest inserted
records), leading to smaller working sets. In this experiment, we
use an initial dataset of 3 GB. In general, eLSM-P2 is less sensitive
to key distribution than eLSM-P1. Under the uniform distribution,
eLSM-P1 causes the highest operation latency. Because the working
set size is the largest when data keys are generated uniformly, and it
causes the highest memory pressure in enclave in eLSM-P1’s design.
6.3 Read Performance
This set of experiments evaluate the read performance of
eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1. We initialize the storage system with
datasets of varying sizes from 8 MB to 3 GB. We then drive a
read-only workload of one million GET requests and measure the
latency of these requests. In addition to Eleos, we consider another
baseline that was mentioned in our initial performance study (in
Figure 2). The baseline places the read buffers outside the enclave
(similar to eLSM-P2) but does not have the data-authentication
measures including the eLSM Merkle trees and proofs (unlike
eLSM-P2). This baseline is thus unsecured but it serves to show
the ideal performance. We use the mmap configuration in eLSM-P2
which allows for accessing files pinned in memory.
The read latency is presented in Figure 6a. When the data size is
smaller than the enclave memory size (i.e., smaller than 128 MB),
eLSM-P1 and the baseline of Eleos perform better than eLSM-P2
because eLSM-P2 incurs proof and verification in the software layer.
When the data size grows beyond the enclave memory (i.e., larger
than 128 MB), eLSM-P2 outperforms eLSM-P1 and Eleos. Again,
Eleos limits the data scalability to 1 GB data. The longer latency
in Eleos may be caused by the overhead for runtime monitoring and
extra data copy in enclave memory. eLSM-P2 generally keeps the
read latency constant with the increasing data size.
On the read path, eLSM-P2 can support both mmap files and a
user-space buffer. Note that eLSM-P1 cannot support mmap files as
such files must reside in the kernel-space memory outside the enclave.
We compare the performance of mmap read and buffer-based read in
eLSM-P2. The result is in Figure 6b. As data grows, the performance
advantages of mmap configuration in eLSM-P2 become clearer. At
the largest data scale tested, eLSM-P2 with mmap achieves 5X
speedup of read latency comparing with the read buffer configuration.
We also compare eLSM-P2 (the buffer configuration) with
eLSM-P1 under varying buffer sizes. Both eLSM-P2 (buffer) and
eLSM-P1 support user-space memory buffers and this experiment is
intended for a fairer comparison. In the experiment, we fix the data
size to be 2 GB and vary the buffer size from 32 MB to 2 GB. The
result is in Figure 6c. It can be seen that eLSM-P2 stays constant
with increasing buffer size (Note that the data size is fixed and this
is a different setting from the previous experiment in Figure 6b) and
eLSM-P1’s read latency increases sharply around 128 MB data size.
In general, eLSM-P2 (buffer) achieves 1.6X ∼ 2.3X speedups
against eLSM-P1.
6.4 Write Performance
This set of experiments measure the write performance of
eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1. In the experiments, we initialize the
system with dataset of varying sizes from 0.2 GB to 4 GB. In the
evaluation phase, we measure the write latency. For eLSM-P2
and eLSM-P1, we consider the configurations with and without
COMPACTION. We also consider the baseline of Eleos.
The write performance with COMPACTION is reported in Figure 7a.
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Figure 7: Write performance with/without COMPACTION in
eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1
We report as the write latency the average execution time of running
an PUT request plus the time for COMPACTION amortized to the
individual PUT. Among the three approaches, eLSM-P1 is the fastest
on the write path. With COMPACTION turned on, eLSM-P2’s write
latency is about 1.3X ∼ 2.3X of that in eLSM-P1. Eleos is the
slowest and can only scale to the data size of 1 GB. Because in both
eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1, the memory footprint in the write path is
limited to a small write buffer (of 4 MB), whereas the Eleos is an
update-in-place structure with the working set size equal to the data
size. Even without hardware-level enclave paging (as is optimized out
by Eleos), the update-in-place structure still incurs a large amount of
memory copies across the enclave boundary, leading to a higher write
latency than eLSM-P2 and eLSM-P1.
We also compare the write performance with and without
COMPACTION. The result is presented in Figure 7b. It can be seen
that turning on COMPACTION, it causes 2X ∼ 4X slowdown on the
write path. In both cases, namely with and without COMPACTION,
eLSM-P2 has a higher write latency than eLSM-P1. This is due to
the overhead caused by building the embedded proof in eLSM-P2.
7. RELATED WORK
Software Systems on SGX: Since the release of Intel SGX, there
has been a large body of research on building software systems
on SGX. The existing works have addressed the in-enclave support
for OS (e.g., Haven [78], Graphene-SGX [29], SCONE [79], and
Panoply [80]), security applications [81], side-channel attacks [82,
83, 84, 85, 86] and defenses [87, 88, 89], databases [90, 91, 92, 93,
94], etc.
In particular, there is a line of research on building key-value stores
in enclave. Pesos [95] supports the secure hosting of a key-value
store where the enclave enforces fine-grained access-control policies.
SecureKeeper [96] secures ZooKeeper style coordination services
hosted in the public cloud. Their approach is to confine the
computation of user-provided data in enclave and to encrypt data
in transit. Eleos [30] supports in-memory key-value stores and
particularly addresses the problem of fitting in enclave data larger
than 128 MB. They provide a virtual-memory abstraction in enclave
and optimize out the expensive enclave paging by monitoring
user-space memory accesses and by relocating data dynamically
between the enclave memory and untrusted memory. HardIDX [97] is
a secure index in enclave that seals external data using authenticated
encryption [72]. Concerto [98] supports concurrent key-value stores
with consistency guarantees. It is based on a novel design to check
strong consistency by leveraging homomorphic secure hash with
enclave. Shieldstore [99] supports in-memory key-value stores by
placing data outside enclave and by running inside enclave an engine
for record-grained encryption and integrity-checking. Shieldstore
does not support data persistence or LSM tree.
LSM Storage Systems: bLSM [55] optimizes the LSM tree
performance by row-based data storage and fine-grained compaction.
Prior work [56] minimizes the write amplification under the skewed
key access pattern. Pebble [57] reduces the write amplification by
organizing storage layout in skip lists and avoiding data rewriting in
the same level. Accordion [100] applies the principle of LSM tree
to the memory management in order to solve the write amplification
caused by frequent compaction. Compaction is critical to the
performance of LSM tree storage. Existing work studies distributed
compaction management in a cluster setting [58]. Beyond disk
storage, the LSM tree has been applied for main-memory databases
with high compression rate [101], on non-volatile memory [102], and
for spatial databases in the AsterixDB project [103]. Concurrency of
the LSM tree is studied in cLSM [104] that supports snapshot scan,
conditional update, and concurrent COMPACTION.
Comparison with Speicher: Speicher [32], published recently, is
a secure system of LSM store with Intel SGX. It places inside the
enclave the data keys in MemTable and meta data in other levels to
enable search. Data values are stored outside the enclave. Speicher
presents a series of performance optimization for efficient IO in SGX.
Our eLSM is developed independently with Speicher. Comparing
with it, eLSM has technical distinctions listed as following: 1)
eLSM supports efficient data reads (GET) with early stops. As
mentioned in § 5.3, eLSM stops processing a GET as early as the
first hit is found, that is, without scanning all the levels. This leads
to significant performance improvement especially for workloads
exhibiting temporal locality (recall Figure 5c). Also, the capability
is much needed in the context of incremental log monitoring where
only the recent records are of interest (see the case study in § 5.7). In
addition, we present non-trivial security analysis of this capability
(i.e., Theorem 5.3 and Lemma 5.4). By contrast, existing work
including Speicher requires each GET to iterate through all levels. 2)
We present a modular implementation of eLSM without changing the
code of RocksDB. This is realized by the eLSM design in embedding
proofs in data records and leveraging the callback hooks in RocksDB
(§ 5.5.3). By contrast, existing work including Speicher requires
code modification of the underlying LSM stores [32]. 3) We have
integrated eLSM in Google’s certificate transparency for a real-world
case study (§ 5.7). We also open-source the code of eLSM [34].
At last, Speicher supports encrypted data keys in the untrusted
world. To search the encrypted LSM store, it needs to “correlate
the block” index of an SSTable with the queried key. As the block
index being accessed is leaked to the untrusted world, its correlation
to data key may lead to information leakage and break the query
confidentiality. This security implication of this leakage however is
not well documented in the paper.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a novel SGX-based LSM key-value store
to address emerging application needs of authenticating data under
frequent updates. The proposed eLSM-P2 system places memory
buffers outside enclave for efficiency. It authenticates the data with
small proofs at selective levels of an LSM tree. Implementation
on LevelDB and RocksDB is presented. The performance studies
with YCSB workloads show a 4.5X speedup of eLSM-P2 over the
baseline of eLSM-P1.
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APPENDIX
A. ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARIES
A.1 Software Guard eXtension (SGX)
Intel SGX is a security-oriented x86-64 ISA extension on the Intel
Skylake CPU, released in 2015. SGX provides a “security-isolated
world” for trustworthy program execution on an otherwise untrusted
hardware platform. At the hardware level, the SGX’s trusted world or
enclave includes a tamper-proof CPU which automatically encrypts
memory accesses upon cache write-backs. Programs executed
outside the enclave trying to access enclave memory only get to
see the ciphertext and cannot succeed. At the software level, the
SGX enclave includes only some unprivileged program and excludes
any OS kernel code, by explicitly prohibiting system services (e.g.,
system calls) inside the enclave.
To use the technology, a client initializes an enclave by uploading
her program to the server host and uses SGX’s seal and attestation
mechanism [105] to verify the correct setup of the enclave
environment (i.e., the binding between the client’s program and a
genuine CPU supporting SGX). During the program execution, the
enclave can be entered and exited proactively (by SGX instructions,
e.g., EENTER and EEXIT) or passively (by interrupts or traps). These
world-switch events trigger the context saving/reloading in both
hardware and software levels. Comparing prior TEE solutions [106,
107, 108, 109], SGX uniquely supports multi-core concurrent
execution, dynamic paging, and interrupted execution.
The software built on SGX relies on an underlying “RPC”
mechanism to switch the execution between the enclave and untrusted
world. In SGX SDK, such RPC mechanism is supported by
ECall/OCall where in the case of an ECall (OCall), the untrusted
host (enclave) switches to enclave (the untrusted host) in order to call
a function there. Alternatively, one can use the LibOS supports in
enclave to load and run unmodified application software in enclave.
There are existing research prototypes for enclave LibOS, such as
Haven [28], Graphene-SGX [29], and SCONE [79].
SGX storage and costs: In SGX, there is a reserved region of main
memory where the CPU stores data encrypted and authenticated. This
CPU-protected region of memory, called PRM, is small and in current
Intel CPU, the size is limited to 128 MB. The SGX architecture
supports a virtual memory in enclave of arbitrary size. When the data
stored in enclave virtual memory is larger than 128 MB, it causes the
event of “enclave paging”, that is, the hardware will transfer the data
between untrusted main memory and the protected memory region
(PRM). The enclave paging is expensive as the process involves
asynchronous enclave exit (i.e., AEX), OS-managed page table, and
SGX instructions (i.e., EWB) to evict a victim page to remap the
requested page. This enclave paging event can easily become the
system bottleneck when the application has a working set larger than
128 MB.
A.2 Merkle Hash Trees
A Merkle Hash Tree (or MHT) [59] is a method of digesting and
authenticating a dataset. Specifically, given an array of data records,
a Merkle tree’s leaf set consists of the hashes of all data records. The
non-leaf node in a Merkle tree is the hash of the concatenation of
the children of this node. The root hash of the Merkle tree digests
the entire data array with records in the fixed order. Merkle trees
are often used in constructing a proof system between a verifier and
a prover. Given a query over a dataset, a Merkle proof consists
of all hashes of the tree nodes surrounding the path from the leaf
(that matches the query) to the root. Hence, it is also called Merkle
authentication path. When the Merkle tree is built over a sorted
dataset, the Merkle proof can be used to authenticate the membership
and non-membership of a query result in the dataset. In particular,
when there is no matching record to the query, the Merkle proof for
non-membership consists of the two authentication paths respectively
for the two records immediately larger and smaller than the queried
data.
B. DETAILED TARGET SCENARIOS AND
WORKLOADS
In practice, the LSM based key-value stores are being
used increasingly in security sensitive applications. As an
example, LevelDB serves as the data storage solution in
security-critical scenarios including certificate transparency log [1,
2], Blockchain/cryptocurrency [43, 44, 110], web browser
storage [111], etc. In the following, we give a more detailed
description of these scenarios before summarizing the common traits
in these target applications.
In cryptocurrency and Blockchain applications, LSM stores
serve as the ledger storage. For instance, LevelDB is
adopted in Bitcoin [49], Ethereum [50], HyperLedger [51],
multichain/stream [52], etc. These are user-space storage systems that
translate application-level reads/writes (on individual data records)
to lower-level file reads/writes. With an LSM tree, they do so
by translating random writes to sequential file writes, while still
supporting efficient processing of random-access reads. Specifically,
an LSM tree represents a dataset m by a series of levels L0, L1, ...
where each level consists of key-value records sorted by data keys.
Upon a write operation, the LSM tree only updates the first level L0 in
memory. When the memory buffer at L0 is full, it flushes all buffered
recent writes (sorted in order) to the disk, creating a new file in L1.
Periodically, the LSM tree will merge multiple levels into one, by
accessing all files/records of involved levels in batch. By this means,
on the write path, it only cause sequential file access, which reduces
disk seeks.
In certificate-transparency log (CT log [1]), LSM stores serve
as a publicly verifiable storage of certificates [112]. A certificate is
stored in the CT log with its identity as the key and the certificate
as the value. It serves the workloads of data updates by inserting or
revoking certificates, and the read queries to retrieve certificates by
identity. The data integrity of a certificate is critical to the security in
CT, as using a revoked certificate may lead to the misuse of a stolen
key and facilitating impersonation attacks.
Web browser storage is one of the canonical applications of
LSM stores. LevelDB is primarily used as the storage backend in
Google Chrome, responsible for storing a large amount of structured
data [113]. The data stored in LevelDB in Chrome can be personal
files and information, used in Browser extensions. For instance,
a Chrome extension for supporting Blockchain (i.e., Nimiq [114]),
LevelDB stores the Blockchain data through the web interface. In
these applications, serving the fresh data with integrity is security
critical (as mentioned above).
User-generated content: For an example, suppose a Twitter-alike
startup company wants to outsource the storage of tweets to a
third-party cloud (e.g., for economic reasons). The application-level
web server accepting user requests will generate two types of queries
for the outsourced storage underneath: 1) writes of new tweets as
social users post them, 2) reads of recent tweets to analyze trendy
stories and to present them in the “Moments” page (on a Twitter-alike
website). This persistence workload features a stream of small writes
that arrive at a high rate and reads that need to be served in a real-time
fashion. An LSM tree is suited to serve this workload – with the
first level (L0) of constant size and a constant number of levels, the
LSM tree can serve intensive writes with small memory and bound
the latency of a read in quasi-linear time. The data authenticity in this
Twitter application means that social users will neither be fooled by a
fake post nor miss their friends’ newest update.
Streaming data analytics: For another example, many big-data
applications, such as real-time monitoring and analytics (e.g., Spark),
feature an intensive volume of data reads and writes as a typical
“big-data” attitude is to collect everything first and to process it
later [115]. They require to minimize the time between data collection
and processing for real-time analytics. An LSM tree is well suited to
serve big-data storage as its log-structured design allows to “collect
everything” at high write throughput and its merge design allows to
“process” the data as soon as possible.
We summarize the common traits in the above application
scenarios and formulate our work in terms of target workloads (§ 3.1)
and security requirements (§ 5.3.1).
B.0.1 Target Workloads
In our target applications, the workload features intensive write
streams and random-access reads. For instance, Blockchain
applications feature an intensive stream of incoming cryptocurrency
transactions and random-access queries to selectively download
relevant blocks/transactions when new Blockchain nodes join the
network (as in lightweight SPV nodes [47]). CT log’s read/write
workloads features an intensive stream of updates, especially in a
large-scale setting such as key transparency scheme (CONIKS [2]).
CT log serves random-access reads to selectively retrieve the
certificate of interest.
In general, our target workload is characterized as below: Our data
model is a key-value store, where each record contains a data key
through which the record is accessed. On the read path, the workload
supports read queries where each read request specifies the data key
and retrieves the associated value. The read queries cause random
access as the data key can be arbitrarily distributed (C1).
On the write path, there is an intensive stream of data writes that
need to be persisted in real time. The stream consists of small
random-access writes where keys are arbitrarily distributed (C1). To
be specific, a data write manifests in an insertion of a key-value
record, where keys can be arbitrarily distributed. The target workload
features an intensive write stream, requiring the underlying storage
system to provide high throughput and low latency.
This target workload excludes many database storage engines that
are designed based on update-in-place data structures (e.g., B+ trees).
In update-in-place structures, a data update needs to overwrite the
previous version of the record at the exact location where the record is
stored. An update incurs lookups and random-accesses of the record’s
previous location, leading to disk seeks and write amplification. The
LSM stores are suited for the target workload of intensive small writes
(C2), due to its append-only design that persists the writes in their
arrival order.
C. WRITE BUFFER PLACEMENT:
MEASUREMENT RESULTS
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Figure 8: Disk writes: Placing data outside
We conduct a preliminary performance study of placing the write
buffer inside enclave (i.e., eLSM-P1) in comparison with that outside
enclave. The latter is implemented by the enclave issuing data
writes to the untrusted memory (even without security protection)
and flushing the write buffer with a world switch. In the performance
result, it can be seen that 1) for an unsecured LSM store, a small
write buffer results in a similar performance with a large write buffer.
2) With a small buffer, placing the buffer inside enclave and outside
enclave result in the similar performance. In other words, placing the
write buffer outside enclave does not improve the performance, yet
incurs much higher implementation complexity.
D. ALTERNATIVE DESIGN:
TCB-MINIMAL CODE PLACEMENT
To decide which part of the codebase can be placed outside enclave,
we take the following view: The codebase of a storage system
consists of “computation”-oriented code and data-access oriented
code. In an LSM store, there are two major computations: the
merge operation and the versioning (the latter is about selecting
and comparing timestamps among different records of the same
key). When placing the computation-oriented code outside enclave,
it entails very expensive cryptographic protocols/schemes to ensure
the computation security. For instance, to ensure the integrity
of computation result, it requires running verifiable computation
protocols [22] in the untrusted world, whereas the state of the
art systems for verifiable computation [23, 24, 25, 26] cause
performance slowdown (comparing unsecured computation) by
multiple orders of magnitudes. Because of this, we have to place
the computation-oriented code inside the enclave.
For the data-access code, it can be placed outside enclave, while
imposing affordable security overhead. Concretely, one can build
an authenticated data structure (ADS) on the untrusted data and
attach a O(logN) proof to individual read/write operations for their
authenticity.
Running the code outside enclave leads to more OCalls (one
Put/Get, at least one OCall) than that of running the code inside
enclave. For the former, one Put/Get operation causes at least
one OCall, while for the latter, it causes a OCall only when it
flushes or misses a read buffer (which can be amortized to multiple
Put/Get operations). Due to this reason, we think the alternative
design by placing code outside enclave is also unfavorable from the
performance perspective.9
9Building an LSM tree outside enclave also require non-trivial
engineering efforts implementing the digest structure.
